

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 18-03-2013		2. REPORT TYPE Master of Military Studies Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) September 2012 - March 2013	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE INTERORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONVENTIONAL US ARMY FORCES				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) Tillis, Terry R., Major, US Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A	
				5e. TASK NUMBER N/A	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) N/A	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A					
14. ABSTRACT This study analyzes the use of civilian interagency partnerships, implementation of Special Operations Forces (SOF), and the education soldiers receive in preparation for a training exercise at one of the three major Army training centers prior to deployment. The Army must seize the opportunity to apply lessons learned from over a decade of war into future training plans and programs. This study does not seek to portray the current US Army training program as a success or failure, but rather seeks to examine the design and execution of the training maximizing the use of Interorganizational partnership to achieve strategic success.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Joint Training, Interagency Training, Interorganizational Training and Partnership					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 70	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Marine Corps University/Command
a. REPORT Unclass	b. ABSTRACT Unclass	c. THIS PAGE Unclass			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-88)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

United States Marine Corps  
Command and Staff College  
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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TITLE:

INTERORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES  
FOR CONVENTIONAL US ARMY FORCES

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AY 12-13

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## **Executive Summary**

**Title:** Interorganizational Training Opportunities for Conventional US Army Forces

**Author:** Major Terry Tillis, United States Army

**Thesis:** This study analyzes the use of civilian interagency partnerships, implementation of Special Operations Forces (SOF), and the education soldiers receive in preparation for a training exercise at one of the three major Army training centers prior to deployment.

**Discussion:** Since 2003, the US Army has incorporated multiple agencies and organizations on the battlefield through contracted replication in order to provide a better trained more agile force. The replicated training enhancements are highlighted by US Government interagency personnel, Special Operation Forces, and non-governmental agencies into a current operational environment a unit may experience during deployment. The Army, like the other sister services, has been tasked to work with multiple commands and agencies through an Interorganizational effort to provide security within the Continental United States and national interests during the transformation into the next decade. In order to achieve this intent, the Army has continually transformed the training exercises conducted at the major training centers. The training at home station and the Combat Training Centers must be aligned with the overall strategic efforts into Areas of Responsibilities that a unit may be assigned to. The Army must seize the opportunity to apply lessons learned from over a decade of war into future training plans and programs. This study does not seek to portray the current US Army training program as a success or failure, but rather seeks to examine the design and execution of the training maximizing the use of Interorganizational partnership to achieve strategic success.

**Conclusion:** The United States Army must leverage civilian interagency partnerships, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and education in preparation for a training exercise at one of the three major Army training centers prior to deployment in order to achieve maximum readiness.

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THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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## *Preface*

The selection for the topic of this paper derived from the curriculum at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. The curriculum provided the author the opportunity to become better familiarized with current national policy and updated Interorganizational doctrine. The author found it interesting to see how updated policy was translated into US Army training guidance implemented at the Tactical and Operational level training programs at home station and the combat training centers prior to deployment. Observing the importance of actual presence for interagency personnel, Special Operations Forces, and non-governmental agencies in the contemporary operating environment are of great value to units in training. The partnered lessons learned in conjunction with a continued education of the force are critical for achieving success in the decade to come for a leaner US Army.

I would like to thank Dr. Otis for her invaluable assistance and insights leading to the writing of this paper. My sincere thanks also go to the writers of the Marine Corps University Command and Staff curriculum for providing the insight to develop a thesis. Substantial insight from the National Training Center greatly assisted in the research conducted on this paper.

## **Introduction**

Over the last decade, The United States Army has been at the forefront of multiple mission sets within the Combatant commands in a progressively complex interagency, joint, and multinational combined effort. The Army, like the other sister services, has been tasked to work with multiple commands and agencies as part of an Interorganizational effort to provide security within the Continental United States. In order to achieve this intent, the Army has continually transformed the training exercises conducted at the major training centers. Since 2003, the Army has incorporated multiple agencies and organizations on the battlefield highlighted by replicated US Government interagency personnel, Special Operation Forces, and non-governmental agencies into a current operational environment a unit may experience during deployment. The improved replication of these organizations at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) provides essential stimulation for soldiers to experience and learn from interaction.

To provide critical training, the Army continues to refine training plans within budgetary constraints to meet the requirements outlined in the National Security Strategy and the intent of the Commander in Chief.<sup>1</sup> With the 2012 elections complete and a refocus of military efforts into Areas of Responsibilities (AORs) other than the Middle East, specifically within Pacific Command (PACOM), the Army has an opportunity to apply lessons learned from over a decade of war into future training plans and programs.

The President of the United States in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense has made it clear that the military will continue to serve as the cornerstone of the United States security and interests. The intent is for the military to do so with complementary efforts in the form of non-military agencies through diplomatic means to achieve the strategic success.<sup>2</sup> This study analyzes the use of civilian interagency partnerships, implementation of Special Operations



Forces (SOF), and the education soldiers receive in preparation for a training exercise at one of the three major Army training centers prior to deployment.

### **Challenges of Current Policy and Historical Capability**

The Army faces budget constraints in 2013 and beyond as the organization transforms into a leaner and more agile force in accordance with the current strategy.<sup>3</sup> The reduction in conventional force size and the increased focus on leveraging the SOF capability are the recurring themes that Army leaders will experience in the coming decade.<sup>4</sup> In order to meet the intent, the Army is in the process of realigning conventional forces regionally to allow units to focus on a combatant command's AOR.

Several publications, highlighted by Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* and Joint Publication 3-57, *Civil Military Operations* have been written to capture lessons learned focused on interagency incorporation, implementation of SOF forces on the battlefield, and an education effort of the Force into the planning and execution of operations in the AORs.<sup>5</sup> Presence of interagency and SOF personnel are vital in the education and training of Army Units highlighted in updated guidance<sup>6</sup>. Training guidance with this intent in mind is published through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Army. The guidance is broad enough to include units deploying as well as those who remain stateside in a nested effort. Military educational institutions from all of the services go to extra lengths to ensure these topics are covered in the curriculum and supplement the curriculum with subject matter experts and interagency representation.

The National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) states that there is a need for coordinated Joint and Interorganizational US Efforts.<sup>7</sup> NSPD-44 directs that “a focal point is required to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the US Government to prepare, plan for, and

conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance”.<sup>8</sup> NSPD-44 also states that the Secretary of State will work with the Secretary of Defense to coordinate the response capabilities of multiple US Government entities and to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations.<sup>9</sup> This document clearly outlines the need for interagency partnership with military forces in its original published date in 2005 and remains current today. NSDP-44 is used as a pillar and assists with the guidance published in all joint publications.<sup>10</sup>

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 highlights the importance of partnering with interagency personnel in the planning and execution of operations while conducting stability operations.<sup>11</sup> This type of partnership is highlighted by JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.<sup>12</sup> A recurring theme in both of the publications is the necessity for partnership in operations other than war. JP 3-0 highlights emergency preparedness, arms control, ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight, nation assistance, and protection of shipping.<sup>13</sup> JP 3-0 highlights the need for security cooperation i.e. deterrence through interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); Host Nation coordination is required to assist in information sharing improving situational and cultural awareness.<sup>14</sup> JP 3-0 specifically states the importance of interagency coordination in unison with SOF integration assisting with cultural awareness as a pillar to success for military units. This guidance is also reflected in the JP 3-08. The guidance in joint publications is clear; the resourcing continues to be the road block remaining from adhering to policy.

The US Army drills deeper into the guidance directed in joint publications to refine the directive to ensure availability for subordinate commands to execute at the combat training centers (CTCs). The US Army published Change 1 to Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, to specifically highlight the directive for Commanders to execute interagency partnering in

support of operations. FM 3-0 replaced the command and control war fighting function with mission command. Mission Command allows a commander to provide emphasis in full-spectrum operations with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners throughout decentralized operations.<sup>15</sup> The Army has applied this guidance through the use of personnel replicating these organizations on the battlefield at the CTCs. Although replicated, the quality of personnel replicating the interagency, NGOs, and in some cases SOF, when not available, has room for improvement. Many of these Tactics, Techniques, and Practices (TTPs) are captured in doctrine and in After Action Reviews to assist units in improving.

The multiple sources of learning provide an Army unit with the ability to train at home station (as individuals or collectively) at the training center prior to deploying. Army Brigade sized units mobilize and ship to one of the three major combat training centers for training prior to deployment. The three centers are:

(1) The National Training Center (NTC) located in the Mojave Desert of California at Fort Irwin is the oldest of the training centers with its inception in 1940 and is currently designated as the premier US Army training center (1981.)<sup>16</sup> The post facilitates mechanized units, as well as light units, training opportunity for Brigade sized elements in a desert environment. The natural terrain widely supports the maneuver of mechanized units and an austere desert environment for light infantry units to negotiate. The NTC possess a professional opposing force (OPFOR) able to replicate a mechanized enemy force to an insurgent on the 21<sup>st</sup> century battlefield. The NTC hires contracted role players to replicate population centers, soldiers to replicate both military and civilian leaderships, and includes a SOF replicated ability in order to assist units achieve training objectives. The foundation for quality training exists within the training center minus the funding and resourcing to continually enhance training.

Since 2001, all three of the centers have upgraded unique capability into each center's current rotational model in order to mirror the NTC.

(2) The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), like the NTC, trains Brigade size level units from both mechanized and light Army Divisions. JRTC is nestled in the Louisiana wood line in Vernon Parish and has been in operation since 1941. JRTC became a primary training center for deploying Army Units in 1993 and continues to train forces.<sup>17</sup> JRTC boasts the ability to tailor training for light infantry units and urban environments as it has in the past while retaining the capability to train mechanized units. This unique ability in conjunction with the similar replication assets that NTC possesses provides the opportunity for quality training exercises within the continental United States.

(3) The Joint Multinational Training Center (JMTC) provides a similar training environment as JRTC but is located in Grafenwoehr, Bavaria, Germany. JMTC, founded in 1976 and reflagged to its current day command in 2003, is responsible for providing and overseeing the training requirements for all US 7th Army/US Army Europe soldiers.<sup>18</sup> JMTC traditionally supports the conventional Army training units stationed in Germany and Italy with an organic OPFOR component capable of deploying. This training center provides the ability to train with geographically close multinational partners from several allied countries to enhance training as well as build common bonds prior to deployment.

Conventional forces come to the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) with a different task organization built around advising Host Nation (HN) security forces with a reduced number of boots on the ground. Each of the training centers possess the ability to educate incoming units, and the ability to leverage SOF forces and replicate interagency partnership in capstone training

events. This helps units to better prepare for future operations and deployments within the various combatant commands.

## Transformation of the Conventional Force through Lessons Learned

Figure 1 displays the Army's evolution in 2008 in response to War on Terror demands into the current footprint in developing a force to support the combatant commands. Both the units and the CTCs are in the process of expanding the capability to continue to train units for traditional high intensity conflict with the ability to expand training objectives into low intensity conflict. The low intensity conflict training is enhanced through the use of updated technology, assets, and education to support current training objectives.




Figure1: Transforming the Conventional Force

Source: US Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2008

[http://pksoi.army.mil/training\\_education/documents/Army\\_Strategy\\_20081.pdf](http://pksoi.army.mil/training_education/documents/Army_Strategy_20081.pdf), accessed on December 14, 2012.

Combatant commands are restructuring staff personnel to include interagency permanent presence. There is an on-going discussion concerning the abolishment of traditional combatant commands into Joint InterAgency Commands (JIACOMS) for nearly five years.<sup>19</sup> The formation of Theater Special operations Command (TSOC) is being implemented to advise and assist Combatant Commanders with SOF operations within the assigned AOR. The Army has had a decade to observe successful and unsuccessful techniques and practices applied conducting stability operations with Interorganizational and multinational partners. The Army understands and realizes there is significant room for improvement in executing partnered missions for combat operations and contingency operations. History provides illustrations of just how much the Army has transformed in an effort to incorporate interagency and SOF partnering at higher levels of command highlighted by the construction and implemented structure of the Combatant Command, Africa Command (AFRICOM)<sup>20</sup>.

AFRICOM is the newest of the Combatant Commands (2008). The command's mission statement highlights the very essence of the importance of interagency partnering. Working through US Ambassadors in concert with other federal agencies, "AFRICOM and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy."<sup>21</sup>

This is an attempt to improve planning and execution of Interorganizational operations with the military working in unison instead of leading operations and is an indicator that 20<sup>th</sup> century lessons learned as applied in a 21<sup>st</sup> century command environment. The development and structure of AFRICOM is an improved organization of years of lessons learned in

overcoming obvious gaps of interagency partnership and the restructuring of all the other Combatant Commands.<sup>22</sup>

The challenges of Interorganizational partnering and stability operations are a familiar recurring theme to military leaders and have been a part of every major conflict over the last two centuries. For example, General MacArthur served as the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), today's PACOM. He and his staff were tasked to execute stability operations in an effort to rebuild Japan post World War II. MacArthur and his staff, through military presence and civilian leadership, provided a solid foundation for the Japanese people politically, socially, and economically in order to achieve the strategic goal of rebuilding Japan. Although it was a military led operation, the rebuilding of Japan highlighted the need for interagency partnership and shaping ability replicated through the Japanese civil government that conventional military forces simply could not.

Political, economic, and social objectives are necessary lines of effort that military leaders must be aware of while executing stability operations. Military SOF in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and PACOM have been executing stability operations in numerous countries of Asia and South America highlighted by success in the Philippines and Columbia for several decades. These unconventional forces, similar to the SCAP, both shared a common understanding that in order to execute Interorganizational operations successfully, the forces had to understand the culture, speak the language, and work through the civil and military leaders to achieve success.<sup>23</sup>

The understanding of a foreign culture is pivotal in the success of military led stability operations. Unconventional SOF forces spend years learning a language, studying a culture, and understanding the application of diplomacy in stability operations in foreign countries.<sup>24</sup> The

ability of SOF elements to understand a culture, identify the key players on the battlefield or within the community, and the ability to share this insight these pivotal contributions to senior commanders makes them a premier asset. This critical capability must be leveraged and built upon at the training centers. Conventional forces recognized the importance of this capability and have attempted to replicate this training model by creating training plans to execute SOF like advisor training in a more condensed manner. These training plans were executed at home station training culminating in a capstone training exercise at one of the three training centers at the Tactical Brigade level prior to deployment. Conventional combat advisors followed a similar 90 day training regimen to prepare for advise and assist operations prior to deployment.

Prior to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, little to no formal stability training occurred for Army units other than the SOF elements. David Segal, then Director of the Center for Research on military Organization, observed in 2007 that, “Three years into this war, they’re figuring out how to fight it,” specifically referring to cultural awareness training in the U.S. military.<sup>25</sup> The lack of cultural awareness education prior to OIF led to a lack of understanding of the Iraqi people by US forces that resulted in offending the locals and often creating more enemies.<sup>26</sup>

Army units received basic cultural cards on phrases, customs, and courtesy training as a satisfactory foundation for additional training. It was not enough to prepare Soldiers for yearlong Interorganizational operations abroad. The Army did recognize the importance of cultural education and immediately incorporated blocks of instruction at each phase of preparation driven by role playing foreign speakers as well as applying the lessons learned. Technology has allowed units to learn in real-time by conducting VTC interviews with units in country or re-deploying. Capstone training events at the CTCs developed training to replicate



these challenges beginning in 2005 to current day. The recognition of cultural awareness training and application of this was the primer the Army used in educating the force prior to deployment.<sup>27</sup>

### **Strategic Guidance Shapes Home Station Training and Educational Objectives**

The first step for Army units to educate prior to deployment is sharing and application of lessons learned. Historical reference, specifically the Vietnam era and operations conducted by SOF elements were, and are now, studied in the curriculum to avoid future errors in training and execution. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) serves as the conduit for gathering data, information, and publishing documents to resource curriculum at all levels of learning. TRADOC initiated the use of technology and shared multiple training plans and material to allow subordinate units to devise training plans in support of current directives at home station prior to training at the CTCs. This often served as the first time for this generation of soldier to familiarize themselves with additional forms of contact encountered during both combat and stability operations. This is outlined in Figure 2 as part of the 2013 Army Strategy.



Figure 2: 2013 Guidance for US Armed Forces Directed Missions

Source: US Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2013

[http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/army\\_strategic\\_planning\\_guidance2013.pdf](http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/army_strategic_planning_guidance2013.pdf), accessed on January 2, 2013.

Educating the force on multiple types of operations in a complex environment is an ongoing challenge for leaders at all levels. The combination of educating the force on what the interagency does, can do, and should do as well as how those efforts affect daily operations in conjunction with SOF partnership still continues to challenge forces in training prior to deployment. Schools for all services, highlighted by the Army's Command and Staff and the War College, assign Field Grade Officers to the classroom with other joint service members and interagency personnel to attempt to bridge the gap in understanding and communicating. The implied task is that each team member provides insight on unique capabilities and experiences to meet the intent of the strategy as a unified team. Between 2006 and 2012, the Army improved training plans with the addition of curriculum that incorporates interagency with SOF personnel focused on allied cultural awareness training into prior to deployment. The Army has greatly enhanced its knowledge base, capability, and expertise within the CENTCOM AOR, specifically Afghanistan and Iraq. The true challenge will be how well these same conventional units operate in unfamiliar foreign territories within the separate Combatant Commands.

Army Units must meet these challenges and remain ready to deploy and support the National interests in accordance with NSS and the Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force from 2013 to 2020 and beyond.<sup>28</sup> The current strategy and directives highlight key efforts that serve as the foundation for updated training guidance at the Strategic and Operational level of the US Army. Several units seek initiative and publish training guidance for subordinate units at the Tactical level based on these documents. The training must be nested in accordance with deployment cycles or windows during a Commander's life cycle within the unit. The opportunity is then presented to utilize relationships formed in the classroom from years past. This relationship ties into nested guidance from the Commander in Chief and highlights the

requirement to execute Interorganizational training at home station and at the CTCs for units at the tactical level.

A conventional tactical Army unit's primary mission is to train for war, contingency operations, or peacekeeping operations all in an effort to prevent conflict, shape the international environment, and win decisively during combat operations.<sup>29</sup> The latest publication from the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army highlight the need for Interorganizational partnership, budget constraints, and succeeding on the battlefield by becoming educated in the AOR units will operate.<sup>30</sup> Each level of strategic guidance highlights the need to execute the training. It is up to the tactical level commanders to gather as much information as possible to include training guidance if applicable and apply to unit plans for action as part of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) concept.

Commanders and subordinate staffs have sought and currently seek opportunity to train during the ARFORGEN cycle prior to becoming ready for deployment. ARFORGEN for a unit would be approximately six to nine months to train for a deployment at home station during RESET, followed by a CTC capstone training event at the Brigade level, and a nine to twelve month deployment under one command. ARFORGEN allows a unit to time to RESET, Train, and become available for deployment completing the process. The RESET model is brigade-centric and focuses on unit, not individual reconstitution.<sup>31</sup> Manning and equipping Army units occurs during this phase of a unit's life cycle and could serve as an initial opportunity to educate the force on the mission set at hand highlighted by the Figure 3.



Figure 3: US Army ARFORGEN Model  
Source: US Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2012  
<https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil>, accessed on January 5, 2013.

The next step in the process is the unit's transition to the train and ready pool. During this phase, units are focused on restoring decisive action war-fighting proficiency through unit collective training and by completing a CTC rotation or exercise.<sup>32</sup> Once training is complete, a unit is ready to execute operations from the available pool mission requirements. Units may be designated to execute as a Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) with an identified operational mission or a decisive action proficient Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) to execute a contingency mission, operational plan, or other Army requirement.<sup>33</sup> These forces are in transition to attempt to align regionally to a specified AOR during this phase to assist with the buildup training plan and CTC rotation referenced by Figure 4. The opportunity exists for units to train in the second step of the ARFORGEN cycle with interagency partners and focus significant efforts in cultural awareness for all deploying to include identified select personnel to serve as a subject matter expert on the AOR the unit may be tasked to deploy.




Figure 4: US Army Projected Force Re-alignment

Source: US Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2013

[http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/army\\_strategic\\_planning\\_guidance2013.pdf](http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/army_strategic_planning_guidance2013.pdf), accessed on January 5, 2013.

The focus for command teams is on the War fighting capability of subordinates during the first two phases of the ARFOGREN for obvious reasons. The portions for education during Leader Development Programs (LDP) or other dedicated blocks of time at home station at a minimum are crucial for a unit to be successful. Familiarizing and educating subordinates with cultural awareness and the capabilities the interagency personnel in conjunction with SOF elements bring to the fight are imperative for mission accomplishment. This educational opportunity should be included in the LPD process.<sup>34</sup> The training should not stop after the first two phases are complete; it is a continual process throughout the cycle. The majority of units are not capitalizing on these opportunities during home station training prior to a CTC rotation or exercise.

## **The Impact of Interagency Partnership**

Current training models viewed by members of the Army's Contemporary Environment Operating Force (COEFOR) at the CTCs continue to observe a gap in interagency presence, partnership, or understanding at the Tactical Brigade level.<sup>35</sup> The former commander of the NTC and the NTC's COEFOR commanding officer recognized the importance for interagency integration in the planning and execution of missions in support of stability operations on the future battlefield.<sup>36</sup> The CTCs currently work diligently to replicate interagency personnel through contracted civilians as an introduction in most cases to a Brigade staff as a training opportunity for them to work through. General Robert W. Cone, the former commander of NTC, observed a noticeable area for improvement when it came to Interagency and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) training or representation.<sup>37</sup>

To overcome the lack of interagency presence, the NTC currently employs over 20 role players who simulate these functions. General Cone stated that the Army's investment in the realism of the NTC environment could easily be leveraged by other governmental and nongovernmental organizations, which could receive training even as they help train soldiers.<sup>38</sup> With this guidance in mind, planning teams have incorporated and improved on the use of replicated interagency personnel during each rotation even though the resourcing is not available for actual interagency presence on the ground.

Planning teams at the CTCs develop scenarios to introduce interagency personnel into the planning cycle and create contingencies that allow a unit to observe the friction or ease of working with these agencies. This interaction occurs through replication of notional orders from Operational or Strategic levels of command. Additional friction points may be added through replicated Department of State personnel trying to accomplish the Department's mission within

the population centers in the Brigade's AOR. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) operating within the units' battle space without oversight from the unit has caused confusion on the ground and provided the opportunity for a unit to experience and learn from interaction with these elements allowing the unit to view friction points within its plan.

The Brigade planning and execution with replicated interagency personnel is in most cases the first time a Brigade staff comes in contact with the opportunity to learn from the interaction. Interagency personnel can assist Army units in better understanding interagency roles in partnership and the decisions that may or may not support military operations.<sup>39</sup> AFRICOM's current success is not only a model to study but the use of Interagency personnel actively seeking to partner, share, and nest overall strategic objectives are a formula for success. This combined approach at educating leadership at all levels can assist in the shaping of actions and decisions junior leaders make that can have lasting strategic impact.

U.S. Marine Corps General (Retired) Charles C. Krulak referred the inescapable lessons of Somalia and other more recent humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and traditional operations, where outcomes hinged on decisions made by small-unit leaders in 1999.<sup>40</sup> Perhaps leaders like General Krulak and other senior members of the Chiefs of Staff saw the need for units to incorporate this type of training and cultural awareness into training plans as a foundation for stability operations. This generation of soldier relies more on personal experience from multiple deployments in the same AORs and that some of the training may be perceived going through the motions vice its desired intent. The NTC encourages the interaction between soldiers and HN personnel to improve on cultural interaction instead of personal experience in order to ensure training objectives are met. This wealth of knowledge will dissipate for Army units as the reduction in forces in Afghanistan continue and conventional units are assigned to

other AORs. General Krulak wrote about the importance and recent history supports that an undisciplined or uneducated few can have a significant impact on the overall mission for all organizations and lives of thousands by executing detrimental acts amongst a HN population.<sup>41</sup>

### **SOF Partnership and Lessons Learned**

SOF integration can serve as the link between interagency personnel, the host nation population security force, and US Army conventional forces. SOF elements can assist conventional units think outside the box and apply strategic level guidance into tactical level training. The onus lies within the Operational level leadership to seek partnership with SOF elements and communicate that relationship to the subordinate Tactical leadership. Conversely, SOF elements are seeking to partner with conventional battle space owners to minimize the friction in planning and operations in training as well as in country. SOF forces are increasing in size, resourcing, and presence within multiple AORs and in many cases they are serving as the only link between US Forces and the State Department representative in the country both elements are operating in.<sup>42</sup> With this in mind, the Operational level commander must emphasize interagency partnership and SOF integration to subordinate tactical commands.<sup>43</sup> The directive in a Commander's intent and to educate the force on the use of available SOF assets and proper resourcing encourages subordinate units and commanders to seek the initiative in bettering the unit.<sup>44</sup>

In an attempt to utilize the SOF assets to form a relationship, build camaraderie, and share experiences requires the presence of individual representatives or a SOF team to interact with a unit on a regular basis. In order for both conventional and SOF units to improve on working TTPs, presence is a must in order to exercise the relationship between the operational and tactical levels of command.<sup>45</sup> The resourcing of interagency and SOF personnel with



appropriate funding and time to align the personnel up at home station or at a CTC Training prior to deployment is required in order to achieve this end state.<sup>46</sup> Conventional Units must know where they are going or at least have an idea of which AOR they could be tasked to support. Most conventional units do have this data and through CTC planning conferences can make contact with SOF personnel outside the organization to initiate team building and planning stateside as well as with in country teams on the ground already working through various challenges.

Teamwork facilitates SOF personnel working in unison with conventional units in meeting training objectives at CTCs in order to develop TTPs and SOPs for use in future operations. Actual SOF personnel who are permanent party or deploying to the same AOR as the conventional unit can serve as the liaison between the conventional unit and the interagency personnel at CTCs. This interaction can be used to highlight and share what the current operational guidelines are and who actually is in the civil leadership position in country at the Strategic and Operational levels.<sup>47</sup> They can articulate how the plan is it nested, and what is pertinent for a leader to issue guidance in support of operations. This combination of knowledge and presence will assist in the combination of lethal training with ability to empower and place host nation Civil and military partners in the lead at the CTCs and serve as the foundation for units to implement the campaign plan on the future battlefields.

The presence of interagency personnel on the battlefield is a factor that is leveraged by Army Senior Leadership. Army leaders acknowledge the interagency in country teams and utilize Army SOF Elements within the AOR to initiate dialogue and assist in coordination.<sup>48</sup> This coordination is one of the core competencies for the SOF elements and as history has demonstrated, these soldiers can serve as a bridge for information flow between multiple

agencies and commands.<sup>49</sup> Policy and Doctrine continually highlight the importance of leveraging these assets essential for success. These critical capabilities should be leveraged by Army Commanders first at home station, then the CTCs, and carried into country through careful planning and resourcing of these assets.

### **Educational Opportunities**

Tactical level commanders seek the initiative to resource training from within and do not intentionally disregard the interagency training and SOF implementation into the CTC train up. The immediate shortcoming is that these commands may not be resourced at home station training venues to execute the training independently. Senior Leaders at the NTC have viewed these Tactical level commands striving to conduct classes and educate subordinates through doctrinal exercises in conjunction with experience from leaders within the formation.<sup>50</sup> Tactical level commands are depending on the education of the Field Grade officers within the ranks to share experiences through personal interaction and resource training from time in Command and Staff or the War College.

The Army Command and Staff College mission statement captures this ideal in the curriculum and the classroom. The college acknowledges a fluid contemporary operating environment that will require leaders for future joint, interagency, and multinational operations as a primary pillar within the curriculum.<sup>51</sup> The school, like other sister service educational facilities make a conscious effort to replicate the fluid operational environment in the classroom. The institution views itself as more than an "Army" school, but as an Interorganizational and multinational college comprised of international officers, sister service, and interagency students.<sup>52</sup> The educational institutions within all the branches of service in conjunction with past assignments and experience provide opportunity for leaders to become familiarized with

current doctrine and guidance. With this knowledge, leaders have been able to seek resourcing and make the directed guidance a priority in improving training at the CTCs.

In order to make the training a priority at the Tactical level of command, the commander must emphasize the importance of training to subordinates prior to CTC rotations. The CTCs provide a unit the ability to train on these objectives and refine the skill sets required to achieve success on today's ever changing and complex battlefield.<sup>53</sup> The CTCs possess the ability to educate and advise units with home station training programs by routinely sending representatives to meet with the Operational level commands to ensure objectives are outlined and met in training opportunities. Educating the commands on the requirement for these types of training objectives will allow the staff to ask the harder questions of why, who, and how to implement the training to better the formation.

Operational level commands are now resourced with Civil Affairs (CA) officers and teams to provide recommendations to the commander, share knowledge across the formation, and serve as the Liaison between the military and civil agencies.<sup>54</sup> Interpreters who will serve as not only language experts, but also cultural pods of knowledge are incorporated throughout command teams. SOF Forces are executing joint training with the conventional forces at home station and at the CTCs.<sup>55</sup> This experience when aligned correctly helps units develop a relationship and cohesion prior to deployment. Each of these three improvements in today's educational programs and training is making a difference and having a positive impact. The success of these units with additional subject matter experts that are known personally to the unit form a relationship that is proving dividends during deployments. The key takeaway is this is what the military is trying to accomplish internally by providing presence on the training battlefield at the CTCs.

CTCs are designed and serve as a central information sharing point to assist units with training, education, deployment, and redeployment TTPs to assist in training competent leaders.<sup>56</sup> Planning for a rotation extends out to 180 days in most cases and affords the opportunity for combined communication from multiple parties to initiate training. Before the plan can be implemented, planners must ask what the objectives are and the end state that the commander would like to achieve with interagency partnering and SOF integration. Some initial points of consideration are interagency training and what can the interagency provide as resourcing or assets for the Soldier. Educating the force in these areas to assist soldiers in understanding policy will facilitate interagency leads to achieve success. The education for leaders is a critical point to grasp and must be implemented early in the training process. Working collectively with a common understanding through resourced interagency leads will assist all organizations in being successful.<sup>57</sup> Although this process exists and works to some degree, leaders must make it a priority for the staff's to implement this type of interaction into training and seek to improve on this knowledge base at the CTCs.

### **Recommendations to Enhance Training Opportunities**

Tactical Brigade level training plan must include bottom up educational opportunities through seeking to partner jointly with SOF elements and equally as important with interagency personnel at home station prior to CTC training. Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC) are reality in country and replicated at the CTCs. The CA officers can serve as the link to the CMOC, but it is the unit Commander's responsibility to establish the relationships with members of each organization in the CMOC. The Commander must ensure relationships are established, nurtured and improved upon in meeting the strategic objectives.<sup>58</sup> SOF liaisons exist at the operational level in person and are available to Tactical level commanders to educate both the

staff and subordinate leaders at CTC, which is a good thing. Although there is room for improvement in establishing this relationship, it is a starting point. Interagency personnel do not exist in person at the Operational level, notably they exist at only a few of the Strategic levels of command.<sup>59</sup> The Army mission is to *Train as We Fight*.<sup>60</sup> The recommendation for interagency personnel to coordinate with SOF elements and CA officers at the Operational level will assist Tactical level commanders in understanding the capability of a CMOC. Initiating CMOC operations at home station as part of a staff exercise will assist a unit in preparing the force to plan, incorporate, and work with non-organic personnel in a more effective manner.

The establishment of CMOCs and use of non-organic personnel at the Tactical level allows units to develop and implement working SOPs prior to arrival at the CTCs. The CMOCs serve as an information sharing center that Army Interpreters can plug in to work by, with, and through host country civil and military leadership. Through actual presence, Tactical level commands can hone skills and identify shortfalls in the planning and training from home station to carry forward to the CTCs. CTCs already replicate and will have to build on this foundation of knowledge into the rotational design. This knowledge base must enhance the quality of personnel to replicate host country security forces, host country civilians, town centers, CMOCs, and a realistic opposing force.<sup>61</sup> This plan if properly resourced would meet the initial intent of senior leaders for training the units prior to executing a CTC rotation. The idea that a unit comes prepared to execute a plan prior to arriving at the CTCs is nothing new and is the desired intent of the Senior Leaders when sending units to train.<sup>62</sup> To make the intent a reality, significant challenges in resourcing must be overcome.

Initial challenges to establish training at the Tactical level are tied directly to current budgetary constraints and a downsizing force.<sup>63</sup> The decreased budget will force leaders at all

levels to think outside of the box to meet training requirements in order to fulfill strategic guidance. A second challenge to overcome is the command and control of interagency personnel in conjunction with military personnel. Combatant Commands and CMOCs established abroad provide a command structure for all partners that military leaders can visualize and execute mission sets within to achieve strategic success in conjunction with host country civil and military partners.<sup>64</sup>

Home station CMOCs can lead to the implementation of mission tailored or regionally aligned CTCs to mirror the force and the assigned AORs would serve as a solution to assist in creating quality training opportunities. For example, if a unit were tasked to support the CENTCOM mission, that unit would attend training at the NTC. The NTC would have to have a rotational exercise design to support the CENTCOM (Middle East) training environment complete with replicated personnel and permanent party expertise focused in support of that AOR. JRTC could do the same for SOUTHCOM aligned units who may be operating in the jungles of South America. JRTC would have to produce a similar cultural package complete with Interagency and SOF elements tailored to that AOR and the use of a densely vegetated training area could provide a challenging and realistic training event for a conventional unit.

These possible solutions will be met with challenges to resourcing. There is just not enough money or interagency personnel don't work for military leadership are two that immediately rise to the top. Compromise must be met and adherence to the intent of the policy must be followed to achieve strategic success. The policy and Doctrine dictates this is how the Interorganizational force will operate in the years to come in multiple AORs under a variety of mission sets.<sup>65</sup> Unlike military CTCs, interagency personnel do not attend a CTC for training event prior to deployment and integration. Incorporation of these personnel who knowingly will

deploy to a designated AOR could align with the unit or at a minimum the CTC the unit will train at. Ideally, the personnel could train Interorganizationally with the unit for 15 days to initiate a working relationship and jointly immerse into regionally aligned training. This is a relatively inexpensive way to meet the intent of directed Policy by improving the overall security and synchronizing the nested intent of both the interagency and military forces assigned to support operations.

### **Conclusion**

Reciprocal desire between interagency personnel and Army leaders to initiate contact, share information, and seek to improve on relationships formed by leveraging all available assets is imperative to meet current and future strategic objectives. A willingness to reach out and apply effort by all parties in supporting and resourcing training at home station, the CTCs and onward in support of operations is the only way to work through the obstacles and find a solution. Effective communication of resourcing issues, conflicts in understanding Strategic intent, and simply raising a hand to say I need help, can you help us. Communication platforms that share a common language are a must and achievable in today's technological age. The establishment of a shared learning architecture between military and interagency knowledge and learning systems, Interorganizational data bases, Interorganizational online courses, Interorganizational simulations, and Interorganizational pre-deployment training or certifications are ways to achieve strategic success.<sup>66</sup>

The sharing of data and experiences in conjunction with a common understanding of the host country culture must be applied into a unified effort when working by, with and through civil and military leadership.<sup>67</sup> Success will not occur overnight, it must be exercised at the CTCs and a recognized imperative training objective met prior to a unit deploying. The rapidly

changing battlefield with a reduced conventional presence in foreign countries highlights the reliance on SOF elements. SOF personnel will continue to be a growing link to the host nation civil leadership, American Diplomats, and serve as the subject matter experts as an interim fix between interagency and convention forces until training is aligned. The SOF will become ever increasingly vital assets for conventional commanders in support of operations in the newly designated AOR upon completion of training at the CTC.

The incorporation of essential assets external to the unit into training requires the education of Army leadership to identify, conceptualize, and apply lessons learned into a coherent plan at all levels of command.<sup>68</sup> Tactical level leaders are charged with leveraging personal relationships and being proactive in educating the force. Shared knowledge centers, data bases, and replicated Interorganizational training exercises continue the education process for Army leaders today and into the future.<sup>69</sup>

The combination of leveraging civilian interagency partners, implementing SOF personnel with current theater campaign plans, and the continued resourcing of education programs to educate the force on updated Policy and Guidance is vital to the transformation of the Army and its leaders for future operations. Each of these items requires the willingness to educate and share information across multiple organizations throughout the federal government and the Department of Defense. Reciprocated professional interaction and communication between interagency personnel and military organizations will continue to be large part of the solution to a complicated equation in meeting unified strategic objectives and success on the battlefield.



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